EXECUTIVE SUMMARY WORLD DEMOGRAPHIC
TRENDS
1. World population growth since World War 11 is quantitatively
and qualitatively different from any previous epoch in human
history. The rapid reduction in death rates, unmatched by
corresponding birth rate reductions, has brought total growth rates
close to 2 percent a year, compared with about 1 percent before
World War II, under 0.5 percent in 1750-1900, and far lower rates
before 1750. The effect is to double the world's population in 35
years instead of 100 years. Almost 80 million are now being added
each year, compared with 10 million in 1900.
2. The second new feature of population trends is the sharp
differentiation between rich and poor countries. Since 1950,
population in the former group has been growing at O to 1.5 percent
per year, and in the latter at 2.0 to 3.5 percent (doubling in 20 to
35 years). Some of the highest rates of increase are in areas
already densely populated and with a weak resource base.
3. Because of the momentum of population dynamics, reductions in
birth rates affect total numbers only slowly. High birth rates in
the recent past have resulted in a high proportion m the youngest
age groups, so that there will continue to be substantial population
increases over many years even if a two-child family should become
the norm in the future. Policies to reduce fertility will have their
main effects on total numbers only after several decades. However,
if future numbers are to be kept within reasonable bounds, it is
urgent that measures to reduce fertility be started and made
effective in the 1970's and 1980's. Moreover, programs started now
to reduce birth rates will have short run advantages for developing
countries in lowered demands on food, health and educational and
other services and in enlarged capacity to contribute to productive
investments, thus accelerating development.
4. U.N. estimates use the 3.6 billion population of 1970 as a
base (there are nearly 4 billion now) and project from about 6
billion to 8 billion people for the year 2000 with the U.S. medium
estimate at 6.4 billion. The U.S. medium projections show a world
population of 12 billion by 2075 which implies a five-fold increase
in south and southeast Asia and in Latin American and a seven-fold
increase in Africa, compared with a doubling in east Asia and a 40%
increase in the presently developed countries (see Table I). Most
demographers, including the U.N. and the U.S. Population Council,
regard the range of 10 to 13 billion as the most likely level for
world population stability, even with intensive efforts at fertility
control. (These figures assume, that sufficient food could be
produced and distributed to avoid limitation through famines.)
ADEQUACY OF WORLD FOOD
SUPPLIES
5. Growing populations will have a serious impact on the need for
food especially in the poorest, fastest growing LDCs. While under
normal weather conditions and assuming food production growth in
line with recent trends, total world agricultural production could
expand faster than population, there will nevertheless be serious
problems in food distribution and financing, making shortages, even
at today's poor nutrition levels, probable in many of the larger
more populous LDC regions. Even today 10 to 20 million people die
each year due, directly or indirectly, to malnutrition. Even more
serious is the consequence of major crop failures which are likely
to occur from time to time.
6. The most serious consequence for the short and middle term is
the possibility of massive famines in certain parts of the world,
especially the poorest regions. World needs for food rise by 2-1/2
percent or more per year (making a modest allowance for improved
diets and nutrition) at a time when readily available fertilizer and
well-watered land is already largely being utilized. Therefore,
additions to food production must come mainly from higher yields.
Countries with large population growth cannot afford constantly
growing imports, but for them to raise food output steadily by 2 to
4 percent over the next generation or two is a formidable challenge.
Capital and foreign exchange requirements for intensive agriculture
are heavy, and are aggravated by energy cost increases and
fertilizer scarcities and price rises. The institutional, technical,
and economic problems of transforming traditional agriculture are
also very difficult to overcome.
7. In addition, in some overpopulated regions, rapid population
growth presses on a fragile environment in ways that threaten
longer-term food production: through cultivation of marginal lands,
overgrazing, desertification, deforestation, and soil erosion, with
consequent destruction of land and pollution of water, rapid
siltation of reservoirs, and impairment of inland and coastal
fisheries.
MINERALS AND
FUEL
8. Rapid population growth is not in itself a major factor in
pressure on depletable resources (fossil fuels and other minerals),
since demand for them depends more on levels of industrial output
than on numbers of people. On the other hand, the world is
increasingly dependent on mineral supplies from developing
countries, and if rapid population frustrates their prospects for
economic development and social progress, the resulting instability
may undermine the conditions for expanded output and sustained flows
of such resources.
9. There will be serious problems for some of the poorest LDCs
with rapid population growth. They will increasingly find it
difficult to pay for needed raw materials and energy. Fertilizer,
vital for their own agricultural production, will be difficult to
obtain for the next few years. Imports for fuel and other materials
will cause grave problems which could impinge on the U.S., both
through the need to supply greater financial support and in LDC
efforts to obtain better terms of trade through higher prices for
exports.
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND
POPULATION GROWTH
10. Rapid population growth creates a severe drag on rates of
economic development otherwise attainable, sometimes to the point of
preventing any increase in per capita incomes. In addition to the
overall impact on per capita incomes, rapid population growth
seriously affects a vast range of other aspects of the quality of
life important to social and economic progress in the LDCs.
11. Adverse economic factors which generally result from rapid
population growth include:
- reduced family savings and domestic investment;
- increased need for large amounts of foreign exchange for food
imports;
- intensification of severe unemployment and underemployment;
- the need for large expenditures for services such as
dependency support, education, and health which would be used for
more productive investment;
- the concentration of developmental resources on increasing
food production to ensure survival for a larger population, rather
than on improving living conditions for smaller total numbers.
12. While GNP increased per annum at an average rate of 5 percent
in LDCs over the last decade, the population increase of 2.5 percent
reduced the average annual per capita growth rate to only 2.5
percent. In many heavily populated areas this rate was 2 percent or
less. In the LDCs hardest hit by the oil crisis, with an aggregate
population of 800 million, GNP increases may be reduced to less than
1 percent per capita per year for the remainder of the 1970's. For
the poorest half of the populations of these countries, with average
incomes of less than $100, the prospect is for no growth or
retrogression for this period.
13. If significant progress can be made in slowing population
growth, the positive impact on growth of GNP and per capita income
will be significant. Moreover, economic and social progress will
probably contribute further to the decline in fertility rates.
14. High birth rates appear to stem primarily from:
a. inadequate information about and availability of means of
fertility control;
b. inadequate motivation for reduced numbers of children combined
with motivation for many children resulting from still high infant
and child mortality and need for support in old age; and
c. the slowness of change in family preferences in response to
changes in environment.
15. The universal objective of increasing the world's standard of
living dictates that economic growth outpace population growth. In
many high population growth areas of the world, the largest
proportion of GNP is consumed, with only a small amount saved. Thus,
a small proportion of GNP is available for investment - the "engine"
of economic growth. Most experts agree that, with fairly constant
costs per acceptor, expenditures on effective family planning
services are generally one of the most cost effective investments
for an LDC country seeking to improve overall welfare and per capita
economic growth. We cannot wait for overall modernization and
development to produce lower fertility rates naturally since this
will undoubtedly take many decades in most developing countries,
during which time rapid population growth will tend to slow
development and widen even more the gap between rich and poor.
16. The interrelationships between development and population
growth are complex and not wholly understood. Certain aspects of
economic development and modernization appear to be more directly
related to lower birth rates than others. Thus certain development
programs may bring a faster demographic transition to lower
fertility rates than other aspects of development. The World
Population Plan of Action adopted at the World Population Conference
recommends that countries working to affect fertility levels should
give priority to development programs and health and education
strategies which have a decisive effect on fertility. International
cooperation should give priority to assisting such national efforts.
These programs include: (a) improved health care and nutrition to
reduce child mortality, (b) education and improved social status for
women; (c) increased female employment; (d) improved old-age
security; and (e) assistance for the rural poor, who generally have
the highest fertility, with actions to redistribute income and
resources including providing privately owned farms. However, one
cannot proceed simply from identification of relationships to
specific large-scale operational programs. For example, we do not
yet know of cost-effective ways to encourage increased female
employment, particularly if we are concerned about not adding to
male unemployment. We do not yet know what specific packages of
programs will be most cost effective in many situations.
17. There is need for more information on cost effectiveness of
different approaches on both the "supply" and the "demand" side of
the picture. On the supply side, intense efforts are required to
assure full availability by 1980 of birth control information and
means to all (fertile individuals, especially in rural areas.
Improvement is also needed in methods of birth control most)
acceptable and useable by the rural poor. On the demand side,
further experimentation and implementation action projects and
programs are needed. In particular, more research is needed on the
motivation of the poorest who often have the highest fertility
rates. Assistance programs must be more precisely targeted to this
group than in the past.
18. It may well be that desired family size will not decline to
near replacement levels until the lot of the LDC rural poor improves
to the extent that the benefits of reducing family size appear to
them to outweigh the costs. For urban people, a rapidly growing
element in the LDCs, the liabilities of having too many children are
already becoming apparent. Aid recipients and donors must also
emphasize development and improvements in the quality of life of the
poor, if significant progress is to be made in controlling
population growth. Although it was adopted primarily for other
reasons, the new emphasis of AID's legislation on problems of the
poor (which is echoed in comparable changes in policy emphasis by
other donors and by an increasing number of LDC's) is directly
relevant to the conditions required for fertility reduction.
POLITICAL EFFECTS OF POPULATION
FACTORS
19. The political consequences of current population factors in
the LDCs - rapid growth, internal migration, high percentages of
young people, slow improvement in living standards, urban
concentrations, and pressures for foreign migration are damaging to
the internal stability and international relations of countries in
whose advancement the U.S. is interested, thus creating political or
even national security problems for the U.S. In a broader sense,
there is a major risk of severe damage to world economic, political,
and ecological systems and, as these systems begin to fail, to our
humanitarian values.
20. The pace of internal migration from countryside to
overswollen cities is greatly intensified by rapid population
growth. Enormous burdens are placed on LDC governments for public
administration, sanitation, education, police, and other services,
and urban slum dwellers (though apparently not recent migrants) may
serve as a volatile, violent force which threatens political
stability.
21. Adverse socio-economic conditions generated by these and
related factors may contribute to high and increasing levels of
child abandonment, juvenile delinquency, chronic and growing
underemployment and unemployment, petty thievery, organized
brigandry, food riots, separatist movements, communal massacres,
revolutionary actions and counter-revolutionary coupe. Such
conditions also detract form the environment needed to attract the
foreign capital vital to increasing levels of economic growth in
these areas. If these conditions result in expropriation of foreign
interests, such action, from an economic viewpoint, is not in the
best interests of either the investing country or the host
government.
22. In international relations, population factors are crucial
in, and often determinants of, violent conflicts in developing
areas. Conflicts that are regarded in primarily political terms
often have demographic roots. Recognition of these relationships
appears crucial to any understanding or prevention of such
hostilities.
GENERAL GOALS AND REQUIREMENTS
FOR DEALING WITH RAPID POPULATION GROWTH
23. The central question for world population policy in the year
1974, is whether mankind is to remain on a track toward an ultimate
population of 12 to 15 billion implying a five to seven-fold
increase in almost all the underdeveloped world outside of China or
whether (despite the momentum of population growth) it can be
switched over to the course of earliest feasible population
stability implying ultimate totals of 8 to 9 billions and not more
than a three or four-fold increase in any major region.
24. What are the stakes? We do not know whether technological
developments will make it possible to feed over 8 much less 12
billion people in the 21st century. We cannot be entirely certain
that climatic changes in the coming decade will not create great
difficulties in feeding a growing population, especially people in
the LDCs who live under increasingly marginal and more vulnerable
conditions. There exists at least the possibility that present
developments point toward Malthusian conditions for many regions of
the world.
25. But even if survival for these much larger numbers is
possible, it will in all likelihood be bare survival, with all
efforts going in the good years to provide minimum nutrition and
utter dependence in the bad years on emergency rescue efforts from
the less populated and richer countries of the world. In the shorter
run between now and the year 2000 the difference between the two
courses can be some perceptible material gain in the crowded poor
regions, and some improvement in the relative distribution of intra-
country per capita income between rich and poor, as against
permanent poverty and the widening of income gaps. A much more
vigorous effort to slow population growth can also mean a very great
difference between enormous tragedies of malnutrition and starvation
as against only serious chronic conditions.
POLICY
RECOMMENDATIONS
26. There is no single approach which will "solve" the population
problem. The complex social and economic factors involved call for a
comprehensive strategy with both bilateral and multilateral
elements. At the same time actions and programs must be tailored to
specific countries and groups. Above all, LDCs themselves must play
the most important role to achieve success.
27. Coordination among the bilateral donors and multilateral
organizations is vital to any effort to moderate population growth.
Each kind of effort will be needed for worldwide results.
28. World policy and programs in the population field should
incorporate two major objectives:
(a) actions to accommodate continued population growth up to 6
billions by the mid-21st century without massive starvation or total
frustration of developmental hopes; and
(b) actions to keep the ultimate level as close as possible to 8
billions rather than permitting it to reach 10 billions, 13
billions, or more.
29. While specific goals in this area are difficult to state, our
aim should be for the world to achieve a replacement level of
fertility, (a two- child family on the average), by about the year
2000. This will require the present 2 percent growth rate to decline
to 1.7 percent within a decade and to 1.1 percent by 2000. compared
to the U.N medium projection, this goal would result in 500 million
fewer people in 2000 and about 3 billion fewer in 2050. Attainment
of this goal will require greatly intensified population programs. A
basis for developing national population growth control targets to
achieve this world target is contained in the World Population Plan
of Action.
30. The World Population Plan of Action is not self-enforcing and
will require vigorous efforts by interested countries, U.N. agencies
and other international bodies to make it effective. U.S. leadership
is essential. The strategy must include the following elements and
actions:
(a) Concentration on key countries. Assistance for population
moderation should give primary emphasis to the largest and fastest
growing developing countries where there is special U.S. political
and strategic interest. Those countries are: India, Bangladesh,
Pakistan, Nigeria, Mexico, Indonesia, Brazil, the Philippines,
Thailand, Egypt, Turkey, Ethiopia and Columbia. Together, they
account for 47 percent of the world's current population increase.
(It should be recognized that at present AID bilateral assistance to
some of these countries may not be acceptable.) Bilateral
assistance, to the extent that funds are available, will be given to
other countries, considering such factors as population growth, need
for external assistance, long-term U.S. interests and willingness to
engage in self help. Multilateral programs must necessarily have a
wider coverage and the bilateral programs of other national donors
will be shaped to their particular interests. At the same time, the
U.S. will look to the multilateral agencies, especially the U.N.
Fund for Population Activities which already has projects in over 80
countries to increase population assistance on a broader basis with
increased U.S. contributions. This is desirable in terms of U.S.
interests and necessary in political terms in the United Nations.
But progress nevertheless, must be made in the key 13 and our
limited resources should give major emphasis to them.
(b) Integration of population factors and population programs
into country development planning. As called for by the world
Population Plan of Action, developing countries and those aiding
them should specifically take population factors into account in
national planning and include population programs in such plans.
(c) Increased assistance for family planning services,
information and technology. This is a vital aspect of any world
population program. (1) Family planning information and materials
based on present technology should be made fully available as
rapidly as possible to the 85 % of the populations in key LDCs not
now reached, essentially rural poor who have the highest fertility.
(2) Fundamental and developmental research should be expanded, aimed
at simple, low-cost, effective, safe, long-lasting and acceptable
methods of fertility control. Support by all federal agencies for
biomedical research in this field should be increased by $60 million
annually.
(d) Creating conditions conducive to fertility decline. For its
own merits and consistent with the recommendations of the World
Population Plan of Action, [** priority should be given in the
general aid program to selective development policies in sectors
offering the greatest promise of increased motivation for smaller
family size. **] In many cases pilot programs and experimental
research will be needed as guidance for later efforts on a larger
scale. The preferential sectors include:
- Providing minimal levels of education, especially for women;
- Reducing infant mortality, including through simple low cost
health care networks;
- Expanding wage employment, especially for women;
- Developing alternatives to children as a source of old age
security;
- Increasing income of the poorest, especially in rural areas,
including providing privately owned farms;
- Education of new generations on the desirability of smaller
families.
While AID has information on the relative importance of the new
major socio- economic factors that lead to lower birth rates, much
more research and experimentation need to be done to determine what
cost effective programs and policy will lead to lower birth
rates.
(e) Food and agricultural assistance is vital for any population
sensitive development strategy. The provision of adequate food
stocks for a growing population in times of shortage is crucial.
Without such a program for the LDCs there is considerable chance
that such shortage will lead to conflict and adversely affect
population goals and developmental efforts. Specific recommendations
are included in Section IV(c) of this study.
(f) [** Development of a worldwide political and popular
commitment to population stabilization is fundamental to any
effective strategy. This requires the support and commitment of key
LDC leaders. This will only take place if they clearly see the
negative impact of unrestricted population growth and believe it is
possible to deal with this question through governmental action. The
U.S. should encourage LDC leaders to take the lead in advancing
family planning and population stabilization both within
multilateral organizations and through bilateral contacts with other
LDCs. This will require that the President and the Secretary of
State treat the subject of population growth control as a matter of
paramount importance and address it specifically in their regular
contacts with leaders of other governments, particularly
LDCs.**]
31. The World Population Plan of Action and the resolutions
adopted by consensus by 137 nations at the August 1974 U.N. World
Population Conference, though not ideal, provide an excellent
framework for developing a worldwide system of population/ family
planning programs. We should use them to generate U.N. agency and
national leadership for an all-out effort to lower growth rates.
Constructive action by the U.S. will further our objectives. To this
end we should:
(a) Strongly support the World Population Plan of Action and the
adoption of its appropriate provisions in national and other
programs.
(b) Urge the adoption by national programs of specific population
goals including replacement levels of fertility for DCs and LDCs by
2000.
(c) After suitable preparation in the U.S., announce a U.S. goal
to maintain our present national average fertility no higher than
replacement level and attain near stability by 2000.
(d) Initiate an international cooperative strategy of national
research programs on human reproduction and fertility control
covering biomedical and socio-economic factors, as proposed by the
U.S. Delegation at Bucharest.
(e) Act on our offer at Bucharest to collaborate with other
interested donors and U.N. agencies to aid selected countries to
develop low cost preventive health and family planning services.
(f) Work directly with donor countries and through the U.N. Fund
for Population Activities and the OECD/DAC to increase bilateral and
multilateral assistance for population programs.
32. As measures to increase understanding of population factors
by LDC leaders and to strengthen population planning in national
development plans, we should carry out the recommendations in Part
II, Section VI, including:
(a) Consideration of population factors and population policies
in all Country Assistance Strategy Papers (CASP) and Development
Assistance Program (DAP) multi-year strategy papers.
(b) Prepare projections of population growth individualized for
countries with analyses of development of each country and discuss
them with national leaders.
(c) Provide for greatly increased training programs for senior
officials of LDCs in the elements of demographic economics.
(d) Arrange for familiarization programs at U.N. Headquarters in
New York for ministers of governments, senior policy level officials
and comparably influential leaders from private life.
(e) Assure assistance to LDC leaders in integrating population
factors in national plans, particularly as they relate to health
services, education, agricultural resources and development,
employment, equitable distribution of income and social
stability.
(f) Also assure assistance to LDC leaders in relating population
policies and family planning programs to major sectors of
development health, nutrition, agriculture, education, social
services, organized labor, women's activities, and community
development.
(g) Undertake initiatives to implement the Percy Amendment
regarding improvement in the status of women.
(h) Give emphasis in assistance to programs on development of
rural areas.
Beyond these activities which are essentially directed at
national interests, we must assure that a broader educational
concept is developed to convey an acute understanding to national
leaders of the interrelation of national interests and world
population growth.
33. We must take care that our activities should not give the
appearance to the LDCs of an industrialized country policy directed
against the LDCs. Caution must be taken that in any approaches in
this field we support in the LDCs are ones we can support within
this country. "Third World" leaders should be in the forefront and
obtain the credit for successful programs. In this context it is
important to demonstrate to LDC leaders that such family planning
programs have worked and can work within a reasonable period of
time.
34. To help assure others of our intentions we should indicate
our emphasis on the right of individuals and couples to determine
freely and responsibly the number and spacing of their children and
to have information, education and means to do so, and our continued
interest in improving the overall general welfare. We should use the
authority provided by the World Population Plan of Action to advance
the principles that 1) responsibility in parenthood includes
responsibility to the children and the community and 2) that nations
in exercising their sovereignty to set population policies should
take into account the welfare of their neighbors and the world. To
strengthen the worldwide approach, family planning programs should
be supported by multilateral organizations wherever they can provide
the most efficient means.
35. To support such family planning and related development
assistance efforts there is need to increase public and leadership
information in this field. We recommend increased emphasis on mass
media, newer communications technology and other population
education and motivation programs by the UN and USIA. Higher
priority should be given to these information programs in this field
worldwide.
36. In order to provide the necessary resources and leadership,
support by the U.S. public and Congress will be necessary. A
significant amount of funds will be required for a number of years.
High level personal contact by the Secretary of State and other
officials on the subject at an early date with Congressional
counterparts is needed. A program for this purpose should be
developed by OES with H and AID.
37. There is an alternate view which holds that a growing number
of experts believe that the population situation is already more
serious and less amenable to solution through voluntary measures
than is generally accepted. It holds that, to prevent even more
widespread food shortage and other demographic catastrophes than are
generally anticipated, even stronger measures are required and some
fundamental, very difficult moral issues need to be addressed. [**
These include, for example, our own consumption patterns, mandatory
programs, tight control of our food resources.**] In view of the
seriousness of these issues, explicit consideration of them should
begin in the Executive Branch, the Congress and the U.N. soon. (See
the end of Section I for this viewpoint.)
38. Implementing the actions discussed above (in paragraphs
1-36), will require a significant expansion in AID funds for
population/family planning. A number of major actions in the area of
creating conditions for fertility decline can be funded from
resources available to the sectors in question (e.g., education,
agriculture). Other actions, including family planning services,
research and experimental activities on factors effecting fertility,
come under population funds. We recommend increases in AID budget
requests to the Congress on the order of $35-50 million annually
through FY 1980 (above the $137.5 million requested for FY 1975).
This funding would cover both bilateral programs and contributions
to multilateral organizations. However, the level of funds needed in
the future could change significantly, depending on such factors as
major breakthroughs in fertility control technologies and LDC
receptivities to population assistance. To help develop, monitor,
and evaluate the expanded actions discussed above, AID is likely to
need additional direct hire personnel in the population/family
planning area. As a corollary to expanded AID funding levels for
population, efforts must be made to encourage increased
contributions by other donors and recipient countries to help reduce
rapid population growth.
POLICY FOLLOW-UP AND
COORDINATION
39. This world wide population strategy involves very complex and
difficult questions. Its implementation will require very careful
coordination and specific application in individual circumstances.
Further work is greatly needed in examining the mix of our
assistance strategy and its most efficient application. A number of
agencies are interested and involved. Given this, there appears to
be a need for a better and higher level mechanism to refine and
develop policy in this field and to coordinate its implementation
beyond this NSSM. The following options are suggested for
consideration:
(a) That the NSC Under Secretaries Committee be given
responsibility for policy and executive review of this subject:
Pros:
- Because of the major foreign policy implications of the
recommended population strategy a high level focus on policy is
required for the success of such a major effort.
- With the very wide agency interests in this topic there is need
for an accepted and normal interagency process for effective
analysis and disinterested policy development and implementation
within the N.S.C. system.
- Staffing support for implementation of the NSSM-200 follow-on
exists within the USC framework including utilization of the Office
of Population of the Department of State as well as others.
- USC has provided coordination and follow-up in major foreign
policy areas involving a number of agencies as is the case in this
study.
Cons:
- The USC would not be within the normal policy-making framework
for development policy as would be in the case with the DCC.
- The USC is further removed from the process of budget
development and review of the AID Population Assistance program.
(b) That when its establishment is authorized by the President,
the Development Coordination Committee, headed by the AID
Administrator be given overall responsibility: [NOTE: AID expects
the DCC will have the following composition: The Administrator of
AID as Chairman; the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs;
the Under Secretary of Treasury for Monetary Affairs; the Under
Secretaries of Commerce, Agriculture and labor; an Associate
Director of OMB; the Executive Director of CIEP, STR; a
representative of the NSC; the President of the EX-IM Bank and OPIC;
and any other agency when items of interest to them are under
discussion].
Pros: (Provided by AID)
- It is precisely for coordination of this type of development
issue involving a variety of U.S. policies toward LDCs that the
Congress directed the establishment of the DCC.
- The DCC is also the body best able to relate population issues
to other development issues, with which they are intimately
related.
- The DCC has the advantage of stressing technical and financial
aspects of U.S. population policies, thereby minimizing political
complications frequently inherent in population programs.
- It is, in AID's view, the coordinating body best located to
take an overview of all the population activities now taking place
under bilateral and multilateral auspices.
Cons:
- While the DCC will doubtless have substantial technical
competence, the entire range of political and other factors bearing
on our global population strategy might be more effectively
considered by a group having a broader focus than the DCC.
- The DCC is not within the N.S.C. system which provides more
direct access to both the President and the principal foreign policy
decision-making mechanism.
- The DCC might overly emphasize purely developmental aspects of
population and under emphasize other important elements.
(c) That the NSC/CEP be asked to lead an Interdepartmental Group
for this subject to insure follow-up interagency coordination, and
further policy development. (No participating Agency supports this
option, therefore it is only included to present a full range of
possibilities).
Option (a) is supported by State, Treasury, Defense (ISA and
JCS), Agriculture, HEW, Commerce NSC and CIA [Department of Commerce
supports the option of placing the population policy formulation
mechanism under the auspices of the USC but believes that any
detailed economic questions resulting from proposed population
policies be explored through existing domestic and international
economic policy channels].
Option (b) is supported by AID.
Under any of the above options, there should be an annual review
of our population policy to examine progress, insure our programs
are in keeping with the latest information in this field, identify
possible deficiencies, and recommend additional action at the
appropriate level [AID believes these reviews undertaken only
periodically might look at selected areas or at the entire range of
population policy depending on problems and needs which arise]. Table 1. POPULATION GROWTH BY MAJOR REGION: 1970-2075
(Absolute numbers in billions)
------------+------+---------------------------+----------------------------
| | |U.S. Proposed Goal for World
|Actual| U.N. Medium Variant | Population Plan of Action
| | |
| | Projections for: | Projections for:
| 1970 | --- 2000 --- --- 2075 ---| --- 2000 --- --- 2075 ---
| | No. Multiple No. Multiple | No. Multiple No. Multiple
| | of 1970 of 1970 | of 1970 of 1970
------------+------+---------------------------+----------------------------
WORLD TOTAL | 3.6 | 6.4 x 1.8 12.0 x 3.3 | 5.9 x 1.6 8.4 x 2.3
| | |
More | | |
Developed | 1.1 | 1.4 x 1.3 1.6 x 1.45 | 1.4 x 1.2 1.6 x 1.4
Regions | | |
| | |
Less | | |
Developed | 2.5 | 5.0 x 2.0 10.5 x 4.1 | 4.5 x 1.8 6.7 x 2.65
Regions | | |
| | |
Africa | 0.4 | 0.8 x 2.4 2.3 x 6.65 | 0.6 x 1.8 0.9 x 2.7
| | |
East Asia | 0.8 | 1.2* x 1.5 1.6* x 2.0 | 1.4* x 1.6 1.9* x 2.3
| | |
South & | | |
South East | 1.1 | 2.4 x 2.1 5.3 x 4.7 | 2.1 x 1.9 3.2 x 2.85
Asia | | |
| | |
Latin | | |
America | 0.2 | 0.6 x 2.3 1.2 x 5.0 | 0.5 x 2.0 0.7 x 3.0
------------+------+---------------------------+----------------------------
More Developed Regions: Europe, North America, Japan, Australia,
New Zealand and Temperate South America.
Less Developed Regions: All other regions
* The seeming inconsistency in growth trends between the UN
medium and the US-proposed projection variants for East Asia is
due to a lack of reliable information on China's total
population, its age structure, and the achievements of the
country's birth control program. |