WORLD DEMOGRAPHIC
TRENDS
INTRODUCTION
The present world population growth is unique. Rates of increase
are much higher than in earlier centuries, they are more widespread,
and have a greater effect on economic life, social justice, and
quite likely on public order and political stability. The
significance of population growth is enhanced because it comes at a
time when the absolute size and rate of increase of the global
economy, need for agricultural land, demand for and consumption of
resources including water, production of wastes and pollution have
also escalated to historically unique levels. Factors that only a
short time ago were considered separately now have interlocking
relationships, inter- dependence in a literal sense. The changes are
not only quantitatively greater than in the past but qualitatively
different. The growing burden is not only on resources but on
administrative and social institutions as well.
Population growth is, of course, only one of the important
factors in this new, highly integrated tangle of relationships.
However, it differs from the others because it is a determinant of
the demand sector while others relate to output and supply.
(Population growth also contributes to supply through provision of
manpower; in most developing countries, however, the problem is not
a lack of but a surfeit of hands.) It is, therefore, most pervasive,
affecting what needs to be done in regard to other factors. Whether
other problems can be solved depends, in varying degrees, on the
extent to which rapid population growth and other population
variables can be brought under control.
HIGHLIGHTS OF CURRENT DEMOGRAPHIC
TRENDS
Since 1950, world population has been undergoing
unprecedented growth. This growth has four prominent features:
- It is unique, far more rapid than ever in history.
- It is much more rapid in less developed than in developed
regions.
- Concentration in towns and cities is increasing much more
rapidly than overall population growth and is far more rapid in
LDCs than in developed countries.
- It has a tremendous built-in momentum that will inexorably
double populations of most less developed countries by 2000 and
will treble or quadruple their populations before leveling off --
unless far greater efforts at fertility control are made than are
being made.
Therefore, if a country wants to influence its
total numbers through population policy, it must act in the
immediate future in order to make a substantial difference in the
long run.
For most of man's history, world population grew very slowly. At
the rate of growth estimated for the first 18 centuries A.D., it
required more than 1,000 years for world population to double in
size. With the beginnings of the industrial revolution and of modern
medicine and sanitation over two hundred years ago, population
growth rates began to accelerate. At the current growth rate (1.9
percent) world population will double in 37 years.
-- By about 1830, world population reached 1 billion. The
second billion was added in about 100 years by 1930. The third
billion in 30 years by 1960. The fourth will be reached in
1975.
-- Between 1750-1800 less than 4 million were being added, on
the average, to the earth's population each year. Between
1850-1900, it was close to 8 million. By 1950 it had grown to 40
million. By 1975 it will be about 80 million.
In the developed countries of Europe, growth rates in the last
century rarely exceeded 1.0-1.2 percent per year, almost never 1.5
percent. Death rates were much higher than in most LDCs today. In
North America where growth rates were higher, immigration made a
significant contribution. In nearly every country of Europe, growth
rates are now below 1 percent, in many below 0.5 percent. The
natural growth rate (births minus deaths) in the United States is
less than 0.6 percent. Including immigration (the world's highest)
it is less than 0.7 percent.
In less developed countries growth rates average about 2.4
percent. For the People's Republic of China, with a massive,
enforced birth control program, the growth rate is estimated at
under 2 percent. India's is variously estimated from 2.2 percent,
Brazil at 2.8 percent, Mexico at 3.4 percent, and Latin America at
about 2.9 percent. African countries, with high birth as well as
high death rates, average 2.6 percent; this growth rate will
increase as death rates go down.
The world's population is now about 3.9 billion; 1.1 billion in
the developed countries (30 percent) and 2.8 billion in the less
developed countries (70 percent).
In 1950, only 28 percent of the world's population or 692
million, lived in urban localities. Between 1950 and 1970, urban
population expanded at a rate twice as rapid as the rate of growth
of total population. In 1970, urban population increased to 36
percent of world total and numbered 1.3 billion. By 2000, according
to the UN's medium variant projection, 3.2 billion (about half of
the total) of world inhabitants will live in cities and towns.
In developed countries, the urban population varies from 45 to 85
percent; in LDCs, it varies from close to zero in some African
states to nearly 100 percent in Hong Kong and Singapore.
In LDCs, urban population is projected to more than triple the
remainder of this century, from 622 million in 1970 to 2,087 in
2000. Its proportion in total LDC population will thus increase from
25 percent in 1970 to 41 percent in 2000. This implies that by the
end of this century LDCs will reach half the level of urbanization
projected for DCs (82 percent) (See Appendix Table 1).
The enormous built-in momentum of population growth in the less
developed countries (and to a degree in the developed countries) is,
if possible, even more important and ominous than current population
size and rates of growth. Unlike a conventional explosion,
population growth provides a continuing chain reaction. This
momentum springs from (1) high fertility levels of LDC populations
and (2) the very high percentage of maturing young people in
populations. The typical developed country, Sweden for example, may
have 25% of the population under 15 years of age. The typical
developing country has 41% to 45% of its population under l5. This
means that a tremendous number of future parents, compared to
existing parents, are already born. Even if they have fewer children
per family than their parents, the increase in population will be
very great.
Three projections (not predictions), based on three different
assumptions concerning fertility, will illustrate the generative
effect of this building momentum.
a. Present fertility continued: If present fertility rates were
to remain constant, the 1974 population 3.9 billion would increase
to 7.8 billion by the hear 2000 and rise to a theoretical 103
billion by 2075.
b. U.N. "Medium Variant": If present birth rates in the
developing countries, averaging about 38/1000 were further reduced
to 29/1000 by 2000, the world's population in 2000 would be 6.4
billion, with over 100 million being added each year. At the time
stability (non-growth) is reached in about 2100, world population
would exceed 12.0 billion.
c. Replacement Fertility by 2000: If replacement levels of
fertility were reached by 2000, the world's population in 2000
would be 5.9 billion and at the time of stability, about 2075,
would be 8.4 billion. ("Replacement level" of fertility is not
zero population growth. It is the level of fertility when couples
are limiting their families to an average of about two children.
For most countries, where there are high percentages of young
people, even the attainment of replacement levels of fertility
means that the population will continue to grow for additional
50-60 years to much higher numbers before leveling
off.)
It is reasonable to assume that projection (a) is unreal since
significant efforts are already being made to slow population growth
and because even the most extreme pro-natalists do not argue that
the earth could or should support 103 billion people. Famine,
pestilence, war, or birth control will stop population growth far
short of this figure.
The U.N. medium variant (projection (b)) has been described in a
publication of the U.N. Population Division as "a synthesis of the
results of efforts by demographers of the various countries and the
U.N. Secretariat to formulate realistic assumptions with regard to
future trends, in view of information about present conditions and
past experiences." Although by no means infallible, these
projections provide plausible working numbers and are used by U.N.
agencies (e.g., FAO, ILO) for their specialized analyses. One major
shortcoming of most projections, however, is that "information about
present conditions" quoted above is not quite up-to-date. Even in
the United States, refined fertility and mortality rates become
available only after a delay of several years.
Thus, it is possible that the rate of world population growth has
actually fallen below (or for that matter increased from) that
assumed under the U.N. medium variant. A number of less developed
countries with rising living levels (particularly with increasing
equality of income) and efficient family planning programs have
experienced marked declines in fertility. Where access to family
planning services has been restricted, fertility levels can be
expected to show little change.
It is certain that fertility rates have already fallen
significantly in Hong King, Singapore, Taiwan, Fiji, South Korea,
Barbados, Chile, Costa Rica, Trinidad and Tobago, and Mauritius (See
Table 1). Moderate declines have also been registered in West
Malaysia, Sri Lanka, and Egypt. Steady increases in the number of
acceptors at family planning facilities indicate a likelihood of
some fertility reduction in Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines,
Colombia, and other countries which have family planning programs.
On the other hand, there is little concrete evidence of significant
fertility reduction in the populous countries of India, Bangladesh,
Pakistan, etc [Of 82 countries for which crude birth rates are
available for 1960 and 1972 or 88 percent experienced a decline in
birth rates during this period. The 72 countries include 29
developed countries and 24 independent territories, including Hong
Kong and Puerto Rico. The 19 sovereign LDCs include Mexico,
Guatemala, El Salvador, Panama, Jamaica, Tunisia, Costa Rica, Chile,
Fiji, Mauritius, Trinidad and Tobago, Singapore, Barbados, Taiwan,
Egypt, Sri Lanka, Guyana, West Malaysia, and Algeria. (ISPC, US
Bureau of the Census)].
Table 1. Declines in Total Fertility Rates: Selected Years
+---------------+-------+------------+--------------------+
| | | | Annual average |
| | | Fertility | fertility decline |
| Country | Year | level | (Percent) |
+---------------+-------+------------+--------------------+
| Hong Kong | 1961 | 5,170 | 4.0 |
| | 1971 | 3,423 | |
| | | | |
| Singapore | 1960 | 5,078 | 6.4 |
| | 1970 | 3,088 | |
| | | | |
| Taiwan | 1960 | 5,750 | 3.6 |
| | 1970 | 4,000 | |
| | | | |
| South Korea | 1960 | 6,184 | 4.4 |
| | 1970 | 3,937 | |
| | | | |
| West Malaysia | 1960 | 5,955 | 1.6 |
| | 1970 | 5,051 | |
| | | | |
| Sri Lanka | 1960 | 5,496 | 2.4 |
| | 1970 | 4,414 | |
| | | | |
| Barbados | 1960 | 4,675 | 5.3 |
| | 1970 | 2,705 | |
| | | | |
| Chile | 1960 | 5,146 | 3.4 |
| | 1970 | 3,653 | |
| | | | |
| Costa Rica | 1960 | 7,355 | 3.9 |
| | 1970 | 4,950 | |
| | | | |
| Trinadad & | 1960 | 5,550 | |
| Tobago | 1970 | 3,387 | 4.8 |
| | | | |
| Mauritius | 1960 | 5,897 | 5.4 |
| | 1970 | 3,387 | |
| | | | |
| Egypt | 1960 | 6,381 | 2.2 |
| | 1970 | 5,095 | |
| | | | |
| Fiji | 1960 | 5,503 | 5.4 |
| | 1970 | 3,841 | |
+---------------+-------+------------+--------------------+
Source of basic data: ISPC, U.S. Bureau of the Census
Total Fertility Rate: Number of children a woman would have if
she were to bear them at the prevailing rate in each five-year age
group of woman's reproductive span (ages 15-19,20-24...45-49). Rates
in this table refer to number of children per 1,000 women.
GRAPH: Live births per 1,000 population (in 7 countries among
those of Table 1)
NOT REPRODUCED HERE
(N.B.: Comment on Table 2. p. 13...)
Projection (c) is attainable if countries recognize the gravity
of their population situation and make a serious effort to do
something about it.
The differences in the size of total population projected under
the three variants become substantial in a relatively short
time.
By 1985, the medium variant projects some 342 million fewer
people than the constant fertility variant and the replacement
variant is 75 million lower than the medium variant.
By the year 2000 the difference between constant and medium
fertility variants rises to 1.4 billion and between the medium and
replacement variants, close to 500 million. By the year 2000, the
span between the high and low series some 1.9 billion would amount
to almost half the present world population.
Most importantly, perhaps, by 2075 the constant variant would
have swamped the earth and the difference between the medium and
replacement variants would amount to 3.7 billion. (Table 2.) The
significance of the alternative variants is that they reflect the
difference between a manageable situation and potential chaos with
widespread starvation, disease, and disintegration for many
countries. Table 2. World Population Growth Under Different Assumptions
Concerning Fertility: 1970-2075
+-------------------+-------------------+-------------------+
| Constant | Medium | Replacement |
| Fertility Variant | Fertility Variant | Fertility Variant |
| | | |
| Millions Growth* | Millions Growth* | Millions Growth* |
+------+-------------------+-------------------+-------------------+
| 1970 | 3,600 - | 3,600 - | 3,600 - |
| 1985 | 5,200 2.4% | 4,858 2.0% | 4,783 1.8% |
| 2000 | 7,800 2.8% | 6,407 1.9% | 5,923 1.4% |
| 2075 | 103,000 3.4% | 12,048 0.84% | 8,357 0.46% |
+------+-------------------+-------------------+-------------------+
* Annual average growth rate since preceding date.
Furthermore, after replacement level fertility is reached, family
size need not remain at an average of two children per family. Once
this level is attained, it is possible that fertility will continue
to decline below replacement level. This would hasten the time when
a stationary population is reached and would increase the difference
between the projection variants.
The great momentum of population growth can be seen even more
clearly in the case of a single country for example, Mexico. Its
1970 population was 50 million. If its 1965-1970 fertility were to
continue, Mexico's population in 2070 would theoretically number 2.2
billion. If its present average of 6.1 children per family could be
reduced to an average of about 2 (replacement level fertility) by
1980-85, its population would continue to grow for about sixty years
to 110 million. If the two-child average could be reached by
1990-95, the population would stabilize in sixty more years at about
22 percent higher 134 million. If the two-child average cannot be
reached for 30 years (by 2000-05), the population at stabilization
would grow by an additional 24 percent to 167 million.
Similar illustrations for other countries are given below. Table 3. Projected Population Size Under Different Assumptions
Concerning Fertility: 1970-2070
+-------------+----------------------+--------------------+------------+
| | | | Ratio of |
| | | Population | 2070 to |
| | | in millions | 1970 |
| | |------+------+------+ |
| Country | Fertility assumption | 1970 | 2000 | 2070 | population |
+-------------+----------------------+------+------+------+------------+
| Venezuela | Constant fertility | 11 | 31 | 420| 38.2 |
| | Replacement | | | | |
| | fertility by: | | | | |
| | 2000-05 | | 22 | 34| 3.1 |
| | 1990-95 | | 20 | 27| |
| | 1980-85 | | 18 | 22| |
| | | | | | |
| Indonesia | Constant fertility | 120 | 294 | 4,507| 37.6 |
| | Replacement | | | | |
| | fertility by: | | | | |
| | 2000-05 | | 214 | 328| 2.7 |
| | 1990-95 | | 193 | 275| 2.3 |
| | 1980-85 | | 177 | 236| 2.0 |
| | | | | | |
| Morocco | Constant fertility | 16 | 54 | 1,505| 14.1 |
| | Replacement | | | | |
| | fertility by: | | | | |
| | 2000-05 | | 35 | 58| 3.6 |
| | 1990-95 | | 30 | 44| 2.8 |
| | 1980-85 | | 26 | 35| 2.2 |
+-------------+----------------------+------+------+------+------------+
Source of basic data: ISPC, U.S. Bureau of the Census
Source of basic data: ISPC, U.S. Bureau of the Census
As Table 3 indicates, alternative rates of fertility decline
would have significant impact on the size of a country's population
by 2000. They would make enormous differences in the sizes of the
stabilized populations, attained some 60 to 70 years after
replacement level fertility is reached. Therefore, it is of the
utmost urgency that governments now recognize the facts and
implications of population growth determining the ultimate
population sizes that make sense for their countries and start
vigorous programs at once to achieve their desired goals. TABLE 4. TOTAL POPULATION, DISTRIBUTION, AND
RATES OF GROWTH, by Major Region: 1970-2000
(UN "medium" projection variant)
------------------+------------------------------------+--------------
Major Region and | Total Population | Growth
Country | |
+-------------+-------+--------------+---------------
| 1970 | 1985 | 2000 | 1970-2000
| | | | Annual
| Mil- Per- | Mil- | Mil- Per- | Mil- average
| lions cent | lions | lions cent | lions rate
------------------+-------------+-------+--------------+---------------
WORLD TOTAL | 3,621 100.0 | 4,858 | 6,407 100.0 | 2,786 1.9%
------------------+-------------+-------+--------------+---------------
DEVELOPED | | | |
COUNTRIES | 1,084 29.9 | 1,234 | 1,368 21.4 | 284 0.8%
| | | |
Market economies: | 736 20.3 | 835 | 920 14.4 | 184 0.7%
US & Japan | | | |
| | | |
Centrally planned | | | |
economies: | | | |
USSR | | | |
------------------+-------------+-------+--------------+---------------
LESS DEVELOPED | | | |
COUNTRIES | 2,537 70.1 | 3,624 | 5,039 78.6 | 2,502 2.3%
| | | |
Centrally planned | | | |
economies:* | 794 21.9 | 1,007 | 1,201 18.7 | 407 1.4%
China | | | |
| | | |
Market economies: | 1,743 38.1 | 2,616 | 3,838 59.9 | 2,095 2.7%
East Asia | 49 1.4 | 66 | 83 1.3 | 34 1.8%
South Asia | 1,090 30.1 | 1,625 | 2,341 36.5 | 1,251 2.6%
Eastern South Asia| 264 7.3 | 399 | 574 9.0 | 310 2.6%
Indonesia | 120 3.3 | 177 | 250 3.9 | 130 2.5%
| | | |
Middle South Asia | 749 20.7 | 1,105 | 1,584 24.7 | 835 2.5%
Indian sub- | | | |
continent** | 691 19.1 | 1,016 | 1,449 22.6 | 758 2.5%
| | | |
Western South Asia| 77 2.1 | 121 | 183 2.9 | 106 2.9%
------------------+-------------+-------+--------------+---------------
Africa | 352 9.7 | 536 | 884 13.1 | 482 2.9%
Nigeria*** | 55 1.5 | 84 | 135 2.1 | 80 3.0%
Egypt | 33 0.9 | 47 | 66 1.0 | 33 2.3%
------------------+-------------+-------+--------------+---------------
Latin America | 248 6.8 | 384 | 572 8.9 | 324 2.8%
Caribbean | 26 0.7 | 36 | 48 0.8 | 22 2.2%
Central America | 67 1.8 | 109 | 173 2.7 | 106 3.2%
Mexico | 50 1.4 | 83 | 132 2.1 | 82 3.3%
Tropical S. | | | |
America | 155 4.3 | 239 | 351 5.5 | 196 2.8%
Brazil | 95 2.6 | 145 | 212 3.3 | 117 2.7%
Colombia | 22 0.6 | 35 | 51 0.8 | 29 2.9%
| | | |
Oceania | 4 0.1 | 6 | 9 0.1 | 5 2.6%
------------------+-------------+-------+--------------+---------------
* Centrally planned economies include PRChina, North Korea,
North Vietnam and Mongolia
** [National Archives photocopy not legible]
*** [National Archives photocopy not legible]
1 The size of the Chinese population, its age distribution and
rate of growth
are widely disputed, not only among western observers but
apparently within
China itself. Recent estimates vary from "over 700 million," a
figure used
consistently by PRChina's representatives to U.N. meetings, to
920 million
estimated for mid-1974 by U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of
Economic
Analysis.
FUTURE GROWTH IN MAJOR REGIONS AND
COUNTRIES
Throughout the projected period 1970 to 2000, less developed
regions will grow more rapidly than developed regions. The rate of
growth in LDCs will primarily depend upon the rapidity with which
family planning practices are adopted.
Differences in the growth rates of DCs and LDCs will further
aggravate the striking demographic imbalances between developed and
less developed countries. Under the U.N. medium projection variant,
by the year 2000 the population of less developed countries would
double, rising from 2.5 billion in 1970 to 5.0 billion (Table 4). In
contrast, the overall growth of the population of the developed
world during the same period would amount to about 26 percent,
increasing from 1.08 to 1.37 billion. Thus, by the year 2000 almost
80 percent of world population would reside in regions now
considered less developed and over 90 percent of the annual
increment to world population would occur there.
The paucity of reliable information on all Asian communist
countries and the highly optimistic assumptions concerning China's
fertility trends implicit in U.N. medium projections argue for
disaggregating the less developed countries into centrally planned
economies and countries with market economies. Such disaggregation
reflects more accurately the burden of rapidly growing populations
in most LDCs.
As Table 4 shows, the population of countries with centrally
planned economies, comprising about 1/3 of the 1970 LDC total, is
projected to grow between 1970 and 2000 at a rate well below the LDC
average of 2.3 percent. Over the entire thirty-year period, their
growth rate averages 1.4 percent, in comparison with 2.7 percent for
other LDCs. Between 1970 and 1985, the annual rate of growth in
Asian communist LDCs is expected to average 1.6 percent and
subsequently to decline to an average of 1.2 percent between 1985
and 2000. The growth rate of LDCs with market economies, on the
other hand, remains practically the same, at 2.7 and 2.6 percent,
respectively. Thus, barring both large-scale birth control efforts
(greater than implied by the medium variant) or economic or
political upheavals, the next twenty-five years offer non-communist
LDCs little respite from the burdens of rapidly increasing humanity.
Of course, some LDCs will be able to accommodate this increase with
less difficulty than others.
Moreover, short of Draconian measures there is no possibility
that any LDC can stabilize its population at less than double its
present size. For many, stabilization will not tee short of three
times their present size.
NATO and Eastern Europe. In the west, only France and Greece have
a policy of increasing population growth which the people are
successfully disregarding. (In a recent and significant change from
traditional positions, however, the French Assembly overwhelmingly
endorsed a law not only authorizing general availability of
contraceptives but also providing that their cost be borne by the
social security system.) Other western NATO members have no
policies. 1 Most provide some or substantial family planning
services. All appear headed toward lower growth rates. In two NATO
member countries (West Germany and Luxembourg),
1. Turkey has a policy of population control.
Annual numbers of deaths already exceed births, yielding a
negative natural growth rate.
Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, and Czechoslovakia have active
policies to increase their population growth rates despite the
reluctance of their people to have larger families. Within the USSR,
fertility rates in RSFSR and the republics of Ukraine, Latvia, and
Estonia are below replacement level. This situation has prevailed at
least since 1969-1970 and, if continued, will eventually lead to
negative population growth in these republics. In the United States,
average fertility also fell below replacement level in the past two
years (1972 and 1973). There is a striking difference, however, in
the attitudes toward this demographic development in the two
countries. While in the United States the possibility of a
stabilized (non-growing) population is generally viewed with favor,
in the USSR there is perceptible concern over the low fertility of
Slavs and Balts (mostly by Slavs and Balts). The Soviet government,
by all indications, is studying the feasibility of increasing their
sagging birth rates. The entire matter of fertility-bolstering
policies is circumscribed by the relatively high costs of increasing
fertility (mainly through increased outlays for consumption goods
and services) and the need to avoid the appearance of ethnic
discrimination between rapidly and slowly growing nationalities.
U.N. medium projections to the year 2000 show no significant
changes in the relative demographic position of the western alliance
countries as against eastern Europe and the USSR. The population of
the Warsaw Pact countries will remain at 65 percent of the
populations of NATO member states. If Turkey is excluded, the Warsaw
Pact proportion rises somewhat from 70 percent in 1970 to 73 percent
by 2000. This change is not of an order of magnitude that in itself
will have important implications for east-west power relations.
(Future growth of manpower in NATO and Warsaw Pact nations has not
been examined in this Memorandum.)
Of greater potential political and strategic significance are
prospective changes in the populations of less developed regions
both among themselves and in relation to developed countries.
Africa. Assessment of future demographic trends in Africa is
severely impeded by lack of reliable base data on the size,
composition, fertility and mortality, and migration of much of the
continent's population. With this important limitation in mind, the
population of Africa is projected to increase from 352 million in
1970 to 834 million in 2000, an increase of almost 2.5 times. In
most African countries, population growth rates are likely to
increase appreciably before they begin to decline. Rapid population
expansion may be particularly burdensome to the "least developed"
among Africa's LDCs including according to the U.N. classification
Ethiopia, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Upper Volta, Mali Malawi, Niger,
Burundi, Guinea, Chad, Rwanda, Somalia, Dahomey, Lesotho, and
Botswana. As a group, they numbered 104 million in 1970 and are
projected to grow at an average rate of 3.0 percent a year, to some
250 million in 2000. This rate of growth is based on the assumption
of significant reductions in mortality. It is questionable, however,
whether economic and social conditions in the foreseeable future
will permit reductions in mortality required to produce a 3 percent
growth rate. Consequently, the population of the "least developed"
of Africa's LDCs may fall short of the 250 million figure in
2000.
African countries endowed with rich oil and other natural
resources may be in a better economic position to cope with
population expansion. Nigeria falls into this category. Already the
most populous country on the continent, with an estimated 55 million
people in 1970 (see footnote to Table 4), Nigeria's population by
the end of this century is projected to number 135 million. This
suggests a growing political and strategic role for Nigeria, at
least in Africa south of the Sahara.
In North Africa, Egypt's population of 33 million in 1970 is
projected to double by 2000. The large and increasing size of
Egypt's population is, and will remain for many years, an important
consideration in the formulation of many foreign and domestic
policies not only of Egypt but also of neighboring countries.
Latin America. Rapid population growth is projected for tropical
South American which includes Brazil, Colombia, Peru, Venezuela,
Ecuador and Bolivia. Brazil, with a current population of over 100
million, clearly dominates the continent demographically; by the end
of this century, its population is projected to reach the 1974 U.S.
level of about 212 million people. Rapid economic grows] prospects
ДД if they are not diminished by demographic overgrowth portend a
growing power status for Brazil in Latin America and on the world
scene over the next 25 years.
The Caribbean which includes a number of countries with promising
family planning programs Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Cuba,
Barbados and also Puerto Rico) is projected to grow a 2.2 percent a
year between 1970 and 2000, a rate below the Latin American average
of 2.8 percent.
Perhaps the most significant population trend from the view point
of the United States is the prospect that Mexico's population will
increase from 50 million in 1970 to over 130 million by the year
2000. Even under most optimistic conditions, in which the country's
average fertility falls to replacement level by 2000, Mexico's
population is likely to exceed 100 million by the end of this
century.
South Asia. Somewhat slower rates are expected for Eastern and
Middle South Asia whose combined population of 1.03 billion in 1970
is projected to more than double by 2000 to 2.20 billion. In the
face of continued rapid population growth (2.5 percent), the
prospects for the populous Indian subregion, which already faces
staggering economic problems, are particularly bleak. South and
Southeast Asia's population will substantially increase relative to
mainland China; it appears doubtful, however, that this will do much
to enhance their relative power position and political influence in
Asia. On the contrary, preoccupation with the growing internal
economic and social problems resulting from huge population
increases may progressively reduce the ability of the region,
especial! y India, to play an effective regional and world power
role.
Western South Asia, demographically dominated by Turkey and seven
oil-rich states (including Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Kuwait) is
projected to be one of the fastest growing LDC regions, with an
annual average growth rate of 2.9 percent between 1970 and 2000.
Part of this growth will be due to immigration, as for example, into
Kuwait.
The relatively low growth rate of 1.8 percent projected for East
Asian LDCs with market economics reflects highly successful family
planning programs in Taiwan, South Korea, and Hong Kong.
The People's Republic of China (PRC). The People's Republic of
China has by far the world's largest population and, potentially,
severe problems of population pressure, given its low standard of
living and quite intensive utilization of available farm land
resources. Its last census in 1953 recorded a population of 583
million, and PRC officials have cited a figure as high as 830
million for 1970. The Commerce Department's Bureau of Economic
Analysis projects a slightly higher population, reaching 920 million
by 1974. The present population growth rate is about two
percent.
Conclusion
Rapid population growth in less developed countries has been
mounting in a social milieu of poverty, unemployment and
underemployment, low educational attainment, widespread
malnutrition, and increasing costs of food production. These
countries have accumulated a formidable "backlog" of unfinished
tasks. They include economic assimilation of some 40 percent of
their people who are pressing at, but largely remain outside the
periphery of the developing economy; the amelioration of generally
low levels of living; and in addition, accommodation of annually
larger increments to the population. The accomplishment of these
tasks could be intolerably slow if the average annual growth rate in
the remainder of this century does not slow down to well below the
2.7 percent projected, under the medium variant, for LDCs with
market economics. How rapid population growth impedes social and
economic progress is discussed in subsequent chapters.
Appendix Table 1
Projected Growth of Urban Population, Selected Years 1965-2000
(U.N. Medium
Variant)
Year World Population DC Population LDC Population Total Urban
Percent (millions)
1965 3,289 1,158 35.2 1,037 651 62.8 2,252 507 22.5
1970 3,621 1,315 36.3 1,084 693 63.9 2,537 622 24.5
1980 4,401 1,791 40.7 1,183 830 70.2 3,218 961 29.9
1990 5,346 2,419 45.3 1,282 977 76.2 4,064 1,443 35.5
2000 6,407 3,205 50.0 1,368 1,118 81.8 5,039 2,087 41.4
Note: The 'urban' population has been estimated in accordance
with diverse
national definitions of that term.
Rates of Growth of Urban and Rural Populations, 1970-2000 (U.N.
Medium Variant)
World Population DC Population LDC Population Total Urban Rural
1970-2000
Total growth (%) 76.9 143.7 38.8 26.2 61.3 -36.1 98.6 235.5
54.2
Annual average growth (%) 1.9 3.0 1.1 0.8 1.6 -1.5 2.3 4.1
1.5 |